Spirit AeroSystems – Too Hated?

The aerospace supply chain is decimated. Everything has stopped. Airline fleets are parked, Boeing and Airbus have dramatically reduced production schedules, and uncertainty is high.

Spirit AeroSystems has been particularly hard hit. The company supplies 70% of the structure on the 737 Max, which represents ~50% of the company’s revenue. Critically, the company is absolutely integral to Boeing’s supply chain. Therefore, Boeing supports the company when needed. This is important because it indicates that Spirit isn’t Boeing’s whipping boy and there is a symbiotic relationship.

Here is Tom Gentile, Spirit’s CEO, discussing the company’s current problems at the Morgan Stanley Virtual 8th Annual Laguna Conference:

“Our biggest program is the 737 MAX. We’re proud partner on the MAX, but obviously
that’s been a difficult situation. We make 70% of the structure on MAX, and historically
represents 50% of our revenue. So when that got grounded last year, after the second tragic crash, it was very difficult situation for Spirit. Boeing suspended deliveries at that
time, but we kept producing at 52 aircraft per month, until in December, Boeing actually
stopped production. At that point, we faced at Spirit, a very significant challenge, because
it did represent half of our revenue. So, we negotiated a new record with Boeing at 216
aircraft for 2020. Which was about a 60% reduction.

Then when the pandemic hit, obviously that was another challenge, and we renegotiated down yet again to 125 aircraft. In June we agreed a third production change with Boeing at 72 aircraft for 2020. But the pandemic also impacted widebody production, particularly because of international travel, and so the 87 program is gone from 14 aircraft per month, It will be 6 next year and 777 is gone from 5 aircraft per month last year, to two next year. And of course, this is not just Boeing, Airbus is also impacted and they’ve reduced their
production by 40%. So, the combination all of the production I guess and cuts really
impacted Spirit.

In the first quarter, our revenue was down 50%, in the second quarter, it was down 68% and we’ve earned a lot of cash from both of those quarters, particularly since some of the working capital, the inventory was already on order and we couldn’t turn it off fast enough, so it accumulated. It will burn off in the future, but with production rate slow right now, it’s burning off less fast.”

So much for an aerospace “super cycle!” Surely the market remained rational and realized this is a “temporary” problem. Surely the market valued Spirit on a long term basis because rates are so low. Right? Wrong!

There is no doubt that Spirit Aerosystems common equity was impaired by the pandemic. Depending on the assumptions, it’s pretty easy to see how the equity was impaired by 40-60%. That said, $2.1Bn is 27.6% of $7.6Bn (perhaps implying this equity price overshot it’s impaired value).

Moreover, it’s possible the world changed forever and pandemics will occur regularly. If that’s the case the impairment may be justified. In fact, the equity may be worthless. However, if 2020 is a unique case it’s possible the period from 2009 to 2019 is a more appropriate time period to determine “normalized” cash flows. Over that time period, Spirit generated an average of $236.6mm of free cash flow.

The current equity is valued at $2.1Bn. If 2009-2019 is a reasonable proxy for normalized cash flows the free cash flow to equity yield now exceeds 11%. In 2017 the outlook was rosy. At that time the common equity traded for almost $10.0Bn. While that valuation may have been egregious, it shows how excited market participants once were about this entity. At $2.1Bn, market participants might be just a little too negative on this entity.

Therefore, this could be worth a research project for anyone looking for a reasonably priced common equity.

Disclosure: SCG recently established a small position in the common equity of this entity.

Pepsi: AB InBev Pt. 2?

Ramon Laguarta, Pepsi’s CEO discussed the company’s strategy going forward. Market share and efficient distribution are central to maintaining Pepsi’s competitive advantages. Discussing these factors, Mr. Laguarta said the following:

“…Whoever wins in e-commerce now and is able to capture those families that are trying this e-grocery service for the first time, I think, is going to win those families in the future. So we’re investing heavily in trying to be the first in that channel and trying to — and again, the investments that we made in the last few years, last year in particular, are helping us both from the data availability, the agility of our infrastructure to supply those channels, etc. So, e-commerce is a key area where we think we can gain market share.

Second is the strength of our DSD system and our ability to service the stores directly. I think it’s a capability that is quite unique, and it gives us the advantage to keep the supply chain going in spite of all the challenges we’re all facing. So that’s also an area where we plan to double down. That improves our execution in store and the inventory in store. And that is also a sustainable advantage.

The third one is brands. I know we have — we’re seeing consumers going back to brands that they trust, and we have quite a lot in many markets that consumers trust. There’s big brands that have been around for some time. We’ve modernized them. We’ve kept them relevant to the consumer.”

All of that sounds great. It’s all logical from Pepsi’s perspective. However, the underlying assumption is that Pepsi can win share of mind in an e-commerce world. While brands are objectively important, it will be interesting to see which brands are the winners. Will customers think of Pepsi or Amazon/Walmart when they think of grocery shopping on the internet?

The key issue will be whether Pepsi’s brands have the strength to pull consumers to those products going forward. The challenge Pepsi (and others) will continue to face is the internet is not the grocery store isle. There is unlimited “shelf space” and the distributor is the entity that owns the share of mind on the internet. To be fair, traditional distributors (grocery stores) also owned share of mind. However, the internet is different because the attention seems to trend toward natural monopolies.

Interestingly, barriers to entry to create a new e-commerce distributor are minimal. On the other hand, barriers to scale and mind share are immense. Thus, barriers to entry are minimal but barriers to success are huge. Therefore, successful, large scale e-commerce companies may be able to increase their bargaining power over Pepsi, Coke, and other CPG companies.

That said, the large CPG companies are going to have the ability to purchase the prime advertising slots on Facebook, Instagram, Google, Amazon, and Walmart. They will be able to release brands quickly and tailor ads to local consumers. Will the economics of these relationships be similar to traditional slotting fees? Maybe. Maybe not.

Regardless, it will be very interesting to watch. There’s always been a middle man between large CPG companies and the consumer. CPG has combatted that via advertising and owning shelf space. However, those company strategies were extremely effective in a world where attention aggregation was much easier (think TV and barriers to shopping outside a local area) than it is today.

It’s hard to argue Pepsi is thriving like it would have if the internet didn’t exist. These financial results, while acceptable, are far from stellar. That said, Pepsi has a heck of a business and returns on capital are improving.

It appears returns on capital have improved driven, at least in part, by improving the cash conversion cycle from 13.57 days in 2014 to -18.33 days in 2019. Straight out of the AB InBev playbook. Interestingly, Pepsi referenced zero based budgeting in the 2Q20 earnings call.

“As it relates to becoming stronger, we are putting an even greater emphasis on our businesses to have a zero-based spending mindset in which we must earn our budgets.”

This will be an interesting one to watch going forward.

No Answers

Dear Stakeholders,

Your manager doesn’t have the answers to the questions today’s world poses. Nor does anyone else. In three weeks, I have gone from (a) contemplating what all the “fuss” was about to (b) realizing the human species is at war against a virus. War forces people to contemplate things they never thought they would have to.

As for your portfolio, we are positioned more defensively than normal. To be sure, the time to position defensively is when times are great. Times are not great. However, the possibility of going much lower exists today. It’s also very possible, though unlikely in my view, that I am writing this at the exact bottom. Humility is why we remain allocated to equities.

Our current bond/stock allocation is ~34/66%, respectively. We will deploy half the bond allocation if things get “stupid cheap.” Moreover, our stock holdings have substantially moved into the “quality” realm; perhaps at the exact wrong time.

People will criticize me for style drift. I could care less. My job is to make sure this family’s wealth escapes this period in tact. As a reminder, wealth is not a number; it is relative purchasing power. Will people accumulate more wealth than we will by seeking distressed assets and being right? Yes. But, we will survive. Survival is our most pressing concern.

If I were you, I would ask why our holdings have changed so much despite my claims of being a “long term investor.” I will discuss a couple major changes below.


It’s no secret I pounded the table about airlines “being different this time.” In fact, on March 4th (only 12 days ago), I said we would hold airlines through this draw down. What changed?

On March 7th, I received a transcript of a discussion that opened my eyes to what was about to happen. If that transcript was even remotely accurate I determined airlines were about to have a liquidity crisis. Yes, the balance sheets are strong, but, in the short term, so is the cash burn. The potential duration of the cash burn is “what’s different this time.” Compounding the problem was the US policy response as of a week ago.

Fast forward to March 14th and The White House mentioned governmental assistance for the airlines, cruises, and hospitality industry. Therefore, I feel somewhat validated in my conclusion. The terms of any bailouts are not being discussed so it’s too hard to handicap how impaired the equity will be (if at all). Therefore, it’s simply too difficult to hold that risk when there are alternative ways to express our view that travel is a staple.

I humbly ask forgiveness for taking a loss on the position. A black swan occurred and I bailed. Whether the risk/reward was dumb at the time of the bet is something we can discuss. Whether bailing was the correct decision in the long term is also debatable. In hindsight it will all look obvious. In real time these have been very difficult decisions.

AB InBev and Phillip Morris

We sold these positions for correlated reasons. Both positions were taken because I viewed emerging market growth as a positive. While AB InBev executed sub optimally, Phillip Morris has done a fine job. That said, both of these companies sell vices into large emerging market populations. Many of those populations are South of The Equator. It is about to get cold there. COVID-19 thrives in the cold.

On or around March 7th, JP Morgan stated (on a call) that emerging market health systems are woefully unprepared to deal with the coming crisis. Further complicating the outlook, COVID-19 is killing people with preexisting conditions. Heavy alcohol consumption has been a contributing factor to COVID-19 mortality rates. Data suggests the majority of alcohol is consumed by the top decile of drinkers. Smokers’ lung health is unquestionably poor.

Accordingly, I have a high degree of certainty that smokers and heavy drinkers in emerging markets will prove among the more vulnerable (unless we eradicate the virus). Thus, I painfully report that I expect deaths to result in a negative decline in the demand curve for these products. Moreover, this instance forced me to consider the impacts of a virus like this occurring again. Accordingly, these entities hold risks we are unwilling to bear.

To be sure, there is a very reasonable possibility we sold “too cheap.” However, Bill Miller’s firm wrote a letter last year that made a lasting impression on me. In the letter they commented that their biggest mistakes came from holding stocks whose fundamentals deteriorated below their expectations at underwriting. In those situations, they held because they thought intrinsic value declined less than price. The results were poor.

Warren Buffett summarized his thoughts on the issue slightly differently when he said “Should you find yourself in a chronically leaking boat, energy devoted to changing vessels is likely to be more productive than energy devoted to patching leaks.” AB InBev has been leaking for a while and I suspect Phillip Morris will prove leakier than I originally underwrote. Thus, we are sidestepping the current risks given the facts as I understand them today.

Again, these may have been poor risks to take in the first place. There is no way to replay the hand dealt. Regardless, after seeing more cards, I’ve decided to fold our hand.

The Current Portfolio

I will not discuss our current holdings here as it makes my job tougher at the moment. That said, I am very happy to be partnered with Berkshire, Dr. Malone and Mr. Maffei, Mr. Roberts, and the team at Markel. I have very limited concerns about whether we will be wealthier in 5 years than we are now. Unless the entire system collapses. This update won’t matter much if that’s the outcome.

The Correct Investment Question, As I Perceive It

As discussed, we are at war with COVID-19. The world economy has ground to a halt in an effort to contain and fight the virus. A time may come where we have to make a collective choice to sacrifice the old and unhealthy to save the economy. Thankfully we are not there yet.

Consequently, I am contemplating three scenarios:

  1. Success – Humans band together, stay inside/socially distanced, and bend the curve of COVID-19. We could come out of this current state in 2-3 months. The mood would likely be celebratory and it’s possible pent up demand results in a spending spree. However, supply chains have ground to a halt so there’s minimal chance of a “V shaped” recovery in the manufacturing sector. This is because there will be a lag between when supply can ramp up to meet demand.
  2. Malaise – The news trickles and trickles out and we stay in this state for longer than 3 months. It’s hard to see how this state of the world could possibly be good for equities over the medium term. Layoffs would almost certainly begin en masse and a deep recession is in the cards.
  3. Failure – We lose the fight against the virus and decide to go on with our lives, albeit with immense pain of human loss. From an investment perspective, that may be OK as the wealth the older generation accumulated and is saving would be passed to people in peak spending years. From a human perspective, it would be devastating and we would probably lose some of the older members of this family.

The situations contemplated above clearly under represent the total spectrum of outcomes. That said, those are the mental buckets I have. It’s noteworthy that the combination of situations 1 and 3 exceed the probability of situation 2 in my mind.


In closing, these are unprecedented times. It’s possible, though unlikely, a drug is developed to kill this virus. Let’s hope so.

I apologize for any imprudent risks I may have taken. I can assure you that I care deeply about not repeating the same mistakes; if they actually were mistakes.

If life were a golf game then COVID-19 is a huge “duck hook” that put everyone behind the trees. Given the circumstances, I think it’s best to chip the ball back into the fairway rather than try to blast it through the trees to hit the green.

There will undoubtedly be a time to second guess these decisions. As stated above, my goal is to make sure we financially survive.

Until the next update, stay home and stay safe.


The Gut to Win

Running a concentrated portfolio is one of the surest ways to win. It’s also the surest way to lose. Moreover, the difference between winning and losing may not be much.

It’s been an interesting two weeks at SCG. Your manager has been public about liking the risk/reward offered on many airline equity investments. It’s only right to acknowledge those public declarations created additional emotional pressure when inevitable uncertainty materialized.

Owning an asset is far different from researching an asset. It’s easy to contemplate a recession, terrorist attack, or outbreak while researching an investment opportunity. For airlines and travel, a researcher would find that even after 9/11 and The Great Recession air travel proved resilient. As shown below, travel demand bounces back pretty quickly.

Source: https://www.transtats.bts.gov/TRAFFIC/
Source: https://www.transtats.bts.gov/TRAFFIC/

It’s hard to imagine scenarios worse for passenger demand than 9/11 and/or 2008-2009. That’s easy to wrap one’s head around. Right? Sure, until you own the position and see this:

Source: https://www.wsj.com/articles/smart-travel-planning-in-the-time-of-coronavirus-11582726776

And what happens when you see headlines about stories about L.A. declaring a state of emergency? See https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/04/los-angeles-area-officials-declare-local-emergency-confirm-new-coronavirus-cases.html. What then? How does your data feel when a stock chart looks like this:

Or, God forbid you decided to own one of the riskier stocks in the sector and stare at a 40% drawdown in under a month?

How does that historical data feel now that IATA projects $27.8Bn of revenues lost in 2020 just in Asia? See https://www.iata.org/en/pressroom/pr/2020-02-20-01/ . How does it feel to watch conferences get canceled? How does it feel to have anyone with a shorter term time horizon say you’re an idiot for remaining long?

Thinking Long

None of that feels like the underwriting felt. It feels scary. It is scary. It’s also not rational. Making matters worse, an investor is able to cut the current pain, and avoid further pain, with just one click of a button. All he/she has to do is sell. That feels so much safer. It’s also a great way to donate profits to Mr. Market.

Fundamentally, an investor is entitled to earn the returns of the business he/she chooses to purchase only when that investor is willing to own the crappy times for the business. An investor is not entitled to return while avoiding risk. Instead, that investor is only entitled to donate return to those willing to suffer.

As Tom Russo has summed up, both the investor and the business must have the capacity to suffer. Running a concentrated portfolio substantially increases the need for an investor to have the capacity to suffer. As a quick aside, Joel Greenblatt mentioned he found letting his winners run to be as, or more, difficult than watching his positions go against him. SCG would have benefited from letting certain winners run longer. That said, we’ve also been fortunate to make some timely exits so the jury is still out on our long term selling record.

If not now, when is this thesis wrong?

One major reason to own airline stocks is a bet that consolidation enables relatively fast responses to demand shocks. COVID-19 has certainly created a demand shock; or at least the perception of one in the US. It’s undeniable that the current quantity of seats demanded will be lower than projected, and will almost certainly see year over year declines. But have the demand and supply curves actually moved to create an industry doomed for failure? Doubtful.

As of today, a bad case scenario would result in 2% of the population dying. That is a lot of people. It’s also approximately less than one year of anticipated seat mile growth. Recently, airlines have managed to keep load factors reasonably stable, which is evidence of rational growth.

It’s not a stretch to think 4 major players could manage a 2% decline in capacity. Moreover, the reduction is unlikely to be permanent given people’s desire to travel. Heck, even now 90% of people are proceeding as planned for Spring Break. See https://skift.com/2020/03/02/nearly-90-percent-of-u-s-travelers-have-yet-to-cancel-plans-due-to-virus-skift-research/?utm_campaign=Daily%20Newsletter&utm_source=hs_email&utm_medium=email&utm_content=84159193&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-85tAqLAorvJy3UYCXoTZpScFaLaC8xeSlOtuSkv7bkvKT0m-XK73LjiiIfQVutz3O_FfDNhhU5EYt-ttBxH7s5JFOFKPcg464bzHsbSDu8bOS6H_Q&_hsmi=84159193 .

But What If They Are Go Bankrupt?

Equity owners of the entities controlling the planes could see a permanent impairment without the industry stopping. All you need to do is look at the time period between 2000-2012 to see the potential devastation. That said, airlines, specifically US airlines, are in a much healthier position going into this potential crisis.

An incredibly bearish argument would say the airlines have 2 months of liquidity before things get really scary.

Source: Company 10-Ks

However, that assumes there are zero revenues, the costs stay almost totally constant, and the airlines cannot mitigate any of the damage. That scenario is highly unlikely. Moreover, if demand falls to zero there are going to be way bigger things to worry about than the health of airlines.

The Most Likely Outcome

SCG is positioning itself to take advantage of further pain. Please note, we hope none happens and pray the human toll is minimal. However, thinking rationally about the current situation, it’s hard to see permanent long term consequences.

Yes, the short term could be painful. Yes, things are scary right now. Yes, it sucks to have a drawdown in a big position. All that said, our view is this virus is here to stay. Accordingly, sheltering in place won’t do anything for most of us. Moreover, most of us will not have our lives impaired. Thus, the probability that Americans decide to incur pain for a meaningful amount of time is low to quite low.

Therefore, we will continue to hold our airline positions and earn the reward liquidity tempts us to sell out of. As stated, the pain is likely to get worse. Potentially much worse. Buckle your seatbelts and put your seatback in the upright position.

Cognitive Dissonance Revisited

Chuck Akre’s firm lives inside my head. “The Art of (Not) Selling” is causing soul searching, confusion, and even a bit of anger. That anger is self directed.

For the longest time I searched for The Answer. Immersed in “value investing” books, praying to the alter of Buffett and Graham, and searching for The Formula. Here’s the problem: The Formula doesn’t exist. Only models and theories.

The past year was a good one for SCG. Given some of our large holdings, it’s remarkable that we kept pace with the index. That said, our performance was catapulted by a large position in Charter Communications, which is not a “value investment” as defined by deciles of valuation. Other meaningful contributors to performance included Apple, Netflix, and J.W. Nordstrom. Our portfolio continues to own J.W. Nordstrom and Charter as of this writing.

Going forward, the portfolio will look different from last year’s portfolio. Much of the change is attributable to our firing of a manager, which brought a substantial percentage of the portfolio “in house.” The decision to part with our previous manager was not easy, but it was the right decision. From hereafter, we completely eat what we kill.

Our strategy is to accumulate minority interests, in businesses we understand, at values that make the risk of permanent capital impairment minimal. As stated before, in the past year, the portfolio benefited from churn. Unfortunately, your manager is concerned he “learned” the wrong lessons.

Focusing on entry price has been a worthwhile pursuit. However, would it not have been better to be invested in quality companies with long runways? Sure, the entry multiples would have been higher, but the tax drag on the portfolio would be lower and we’d still own the businesses. See Charter as an example of a business that wouldn’t screen cheap but almost certainly was when we acquired our interest.

One could reasonably argue that worrying about not focusing enough on terminal values is a great “late cycle” indicator. Maybe, but also maybe not. Two quotes come to mind (thank you to @tsoh_investing on Twitter):

  • “The role of financial markets is to take money away from mediocre and underperforming companies and put it in stable, growing, high return on capital companies. Money has an almost metaphysical attraction to places where it is put to careful, good use. You can fight that trend, and invest in companies, for instance that are deeply undervalued and mismanaged – and some people are successful investing in the dregs – but very few over the long term. To use a whitewater kayaking analogy, freshwater seeks saltwater, and you can fight that if you want, but paddling upstream eventually is likely to become highly problematic.” https://microcapclub.com/2015/05/i-passed-on-berkshire-hathaway-at-97-per-share/
  • “Generally speaking, I think if you’re sure enough about a business being wonderful, it’s more important to be certain about the business being a wonderful business than it is to be certain that the price is not 10% too high … That’s a philosophy that I came slowly to. I originally was incredibly price conscious. We used to have prayer meetings before we would raise our bid an eighth. But that was a mistake. And in some cases, a huge mistake. I mean, we’ve missed things because of that.” – Warren Buffett, 1997 Shareholder Meeting, Morning Session.

In defense of our strategy, with the exception of Wells Fargo, I think it’s hard to argue our holdings are “poorly managed.” Facebook is one that many would argue should fall into that category. Personally, I might agree. However, that is a judgment call and, to the extent possible, we will invest based on fundamental truths. One of those fundamental truths is Zuckerberg built one of the biggest social networks ever and acquired two more. Thus, management is at least acceptable.

The current contemplation of whether our focus on entry price is misguided stems from a different framing of math. On one hand, it is very hard to lose when you are purchasing a $1.00 for $0.50. However, it’s also very hard to win big and IRRs will depend on how quickly the market realizes that $1.00.

On the other hand, investing is one of the few games where winners can run for a very, very long time. Importantly, strong organizations attract strong people. Those strong people tend to win. Consequently, while there is momentum in stock prices there is also business momentum. Thus, $1.00 can turn into $5.00 over time. Has a focus on entry price undervalued the momentum benefiting truly great organizations? Perhaps. To not at least contemplate that question is to remain stupid. We will not do that.

To be clear, we own our perception of good businesses. Each serves an important function in its customer’s lives. Many of these businesses are mature and cannibalizing shares. Therefore, on a per share basis, we are quite comfortable with our existing portfolio’s growth rate. Moreover, the portfolio is reasonably priced. As of this writing the Top 10 holdings, accounting for 64% of the portfolio are as follows:

Note: The weighting of the positions in this year’s portfolio are materially different from last year’s. As stated above, this is the result of firing a manager and merging the portfolios. Going forward, all major accounts are consolidated and further large changes are not anticipated.

Of the businesses listed above, Phillip Morris (PM) appears to be the one at greatest risk of deterioration. That said, we own the company because it sells an addictive product, has room to take prices, and is a low cost producer. Longer term, it’s plausible that PM acquires other cigarette makers (it recently tried to acquire Altria) and the volume deterioration is slower than anticipated. Phillip Morris rhymes with AB InBev (now a smaller position due to portfolio consolidation) because both entities have dominant positions, are suffering from volume declines, and benefit from raising prices.

Going forward, SCG will probably own fewer of these types of businesses and look to own businesses that are growing volumes as well. Mr. Akre makes a compelling case that it’s better to own a business that can grow its way out of a period of overvaluation. I will put more energy and focus into finding those situations.

Thank you for your continued trust. I commit to taking fewer actions in the future and finding greater long term, durable, investments. For now, our results have been satisfactory. Thus, expect at least some of the same behaviors to recur.

Realized vs. Theoretical Gains

There’s a big difference between a company I am researching and one I have actual money on the line with. Perhaps I am flawed and need to intensify my emotional state when I research. But, I think the more likely explanation is real money intensifies the analysis/emotion. It’s one thing to see a historical operational hiccup, subsequent recovery, and determine “I can live through that.” It’s quite another to live through the hiccup and wonder whether the recovery will happen.

Similarly, it’s quite easy to say “This company is way too cheap!” I strongly believed Nordstom, Inc. was too cheap in August when the stock sold off in conjunction with Macy’s results. So I bought.

But here’s the problem: Nordstom faces structural headwinds, may or may not be innovative enough to grow its business long term, and has a lot of fixed costs embedded in the business. Therefore, if things unravel at Nordstrom they could unravel quickly.

So, why did I buy? I bought because I discussed the brand with a group of women who provided me with some comfort about Nordstrom’s brand equity. Moreover, I pay enough attention to retail to know the management team is attempting to transition the company to a modern retailer (unlike Macy’s). Further, I interviewed employees that told me the culture at Nordstrom is the best in the industry. Finally, the Nordstrom family (a) owns a large block of stock, (b) tried to take it private two years ago at near 2x my purchase price, and (c) committed to returning ~$5Bn to shareholders over the next 5 years (vs. a ~$3.9Bn mkt. cap at the time). Note – Family is italicized above because I think there’s a lot more pride on the line when the store bears the name of major shareholders than there is in most situations.

The “opportunity” presented itself because Nordstrom has not executed well over the last 3 quarters. I believe Blake Nordstrom’s death (Blake was a Nordstrom family member, co-President, and largely responsible for running Nordstrom Rack) was a very difficult event for the family/organization and sometimes life gets in the way of optimal business performance. Part of my belief stems from reading about Blake. Moreover, when I spoke to investor relations the woman I spoke to choked up a bit when I offered my condolences. Given everything above, I believe the market sees a potentially broken business with headwinds and I see a business that is facing headwinds but isn’t broken (though the business quality is clearly deteriorating from what it once was).

Despite the risks, I made the bet and was ready to collect dividends, watch share repurchases reduce the dividend obligation, and collect subsequent increased dividends (dividends per share would increase as shares outstanding decreased assuming the dividend payout remained the same). I “knew” the risks I took/am taking. I understand there is a path to failure in this investment. But, at the price I purchased the equity I thought the market was emphasizing the failure potential too much and missing a lot of the good the entity has going for it.

Shortly thereafter, the stock increased almost 40%. At that point, the decision to hold became a bit more difficult. The risk of failure also felt more acute because now Mr. Market was pricing in a more rosy scenario. Importantly, risks that lived on a spreadsheet or in a writeup now actually presented potential loss of real money and the odds had changed. At this valuation, the proposed share repurchases don’t accomplish as much. Moreover, the business risks haven’t changed. That said, if Nordstrom can accomplish their goals there is still quite a bit of value in the entity. Therefore, I decided to sell half my position to reduce some portfolio risk (Nordstrom was a ~5% portfolio weight at cost).

On the other hand, my second largest position (13% current portfolio weight) is in cable companies (Charter and Comcast). These have meaningfully appreciated. However, I haven’t even considered selling either because I fundamentally believe in owning broadband infrastructure for the long term. Thus, it would take a pretty egregious price to have me sell either position at this point. NOTE – I am not saying to buy cable company stocks right now! Nothing here is investment advice.

So, while a spreadsheet may produce similar IRRs for those two investments, the experience of owning the assets is quite different. The obvious response to what I am writing is “Retail investors should require a higher IRR to enter positions than cable company investors since there is less business risk in a cable company.” First, I agree. But more importantly, the right behavior/stomach is necessary to realize the theoretical IRR. And, that behavior can be difficult to handicap until the asset resides in an investor’s portfolio.

Generally speaking, I’ve found assets purchased because of valuation are much more difficult to hold because there is usually some element of business risk attached to them. Consequently, my focus has morphed to higher quality businesses trading at reasonable prices. However, I can’t help but look at my perception of mispriced assets. After all, I am trying to buy more value than I am paying for.

That said, the real gains are made from holding. And holding business risk is a lot tougher than it looks on a spreadsheet. Which is probably why the opportunity exists for those that are (a) right and (b) selective on price.

Recommended Reading


Know What You Own

Andrew Rangeley recently wrote about sharing his investment ideas. The full post can be found at http://yetanothervalueblog.com/2019/07/some-things-and-ideas-july-2019.html. In the post, Andrew wrote “…the longer I invest, the more I think the most important part of this job / doing the work around this job is developing the conviction to hold an investment thesis.” I couldn’t agree more.

When I started investing I would look at what other people were doing and try to back into why they owned what they owned. I still think that’s a useful, and interesting, exercise. However, you must make sure you don’t rely on the conclusion of the person you are researching. Instead, research the idea in order to determine whether that particular asset is right for your portfolio.

The world has many potential outcomes. Unless you know why you own a position how will you know when to sell? Which path of outcomes bothers you and which paths are you OK with? I guess you can follow some famous investor’s SEC filings and sell when they sell. But, if you implement that strategy I would strongly advise against checking stock prices in between filings.

What happens if you follow your favorite blogger/Twitter account into a position? How will you know if they’ve changed their minds? You probably won’t. And they probably won’t think to tell you when they exit. You have to know what you own and why.

A recent example from this blog is Ryanair (RYAAY). I highlighted RYAAY as an interesting investment idea on May 22, 2019. As a quick aside, this is a good time to remind everyone reading this post that nothing here is investment advice. Anything SCG writes about is meant to highlight interesting things to research and/or look into for learning purposes only.

Anyway, the stock traded at ~$68/sh when we wrote about it. A mere 3 months later the stock traded at ~$57/sh. A 17% “loss” in 3 months (aka -68% annualized return). Impeccable market timing! Was I concerned? Not even a little. Would I have been concerned if I followed someone else into the position? Heck yes! SCG probably would have sold.

Furthermore, I worry that someone may have followed us into the position and sold at the wrong time. I implore anyone reading this not to buy anything I write about. If it interests you then please do your own research. Develop your own conviction so you know when to worry and when not to. Otherwise, you’re just donating money to people that did their work.

Unexpected Lessons

This site’s goal is to become a resource for people interested in investments. Therefore, almost all posts will be investment specific. However, there are exceptions to the rule. Arnold Van Den Berg’s life lessons are one of those exceptions.

Last week I attended an investment event organized by MOI Global. I enjoy those events because the community of investors is a truly amazing group of people. Therefore, I was intrigued when I saw a group of people gathered around a table at a cocktail hour. I figured some investing legend was waxing poetic about the merits of his/her investments. Naturally, I went to the table.

When I got to the table I saw Arnold Van Den Berg. I liked Mr. Van Den Berg’s talk at Google so I was excited to hear what he had to say. I was mesmorized the minute I sat down.

Mr. Van Den Berg was telling stories about his parents surviving Auschwitz. The most memorable story described his father surviving death marches. A death march was a 24 hour hike through deep snow. The participants had “normal” clothes on. If someone’s knee touched the snow, the Nazis beat them. If the person didn’t get up, the Nazis killed them.

Mr. Van Den Berg said his dad survived by focusing on locking his knee the second his foot touched the ground. Why? Because that was the only way to:

  • keep his knee high enough out of the snow, and
  • support his body weight given how depleted his body was.

His father attributed his survival on his ability to singularly focus on that task. His ability to focus was driven by his will to survive. And, his will to survive existed because of his family. Regardless of his circumstances, he focused on his wife and children.

Throughout his time at Auschwitz Mr. Van Den Berg’s father would see young, able bodied men come into the camp. Almost all of them withered away within 6 months. Arnold’s father said many of them lost the will to live because they didn’t have a larger purpose. Once they lost the will to live, death was inevitable.

I tried to absorb everything I could from Mr. Van Den Berg. Some lessons include:

  • When your life is more important than your principles, you sacrifice your principles. When your principles are more important than your life, you sacrifice your life. Mr. Van Den Berg is alive today because a young woman valued her principles enough to risk her life in order to smuggle him out of Amsterdam.
  • Never underestimate the power of the subconscious mind.
  • Focus is key to success.
  • Never give up. Whatever failure brought you to the point where you’re considering giving up also took you closer to success.
  • In order to be successful you must:
    • (a) be totally honest with yourself,
    • (b) repeat the actions necessary to become who you want to be,
    • (c) do good (the universe rewards those that legitimately add value),
    • (d) believe in yourself and your life direction.

Some of this advice may sound like self help BS. But, it’s coming from a man that grew up with a father and mother that survived the Holocaust. Moreover, he survived being in an orphanage while his parents were in Auschwitz. He lost 39 family members over that period. Therefore, I think his perspective on life is one worth taking seriously.

This post isn’t going to help anyone outperform the market. It won’t bring anyone back from sizing a position too big or making some analytical mistake. But, hopefully it keeps the world in perspective and helps someone realize how lucky they are. There’s a lot to be grateful for. Take a moment, remember that, call your loved ones, then get back to trying to outperform.

Recommended Reading/Viewing:

Mr. Van Den Berg at Google


https://www.barnesandnoble.com/w/mans-search-for-meaning-with-new-foreward-viktor-e-frankl/1028813627#/ – Haven’t read this but @jerrycap recommended it and his book choices are pretty solid.


The spirit of Henry Singleton cried a little this earnings season. If you don’t know who he is see https://25iq.com/2014/11/08/a-dozen-things-ive-learned-from-henry-singleton-about-value-investing-venture-capital/. In short, he was one of the best capital allocators of all time. He issued shares when Mr. Market loved his company and bought them back when Mr. Market didn’t like his company. Dr. Singleton didn’t care about Mr. Market’s opinion. He used Mr. Market to his advantage.

Today, corporate share buybacks are all over the news. On December 21, 2018 Barron’s ran an article about corporate buybacks setting a record in 2018. https://www.barrons.com/articles/2018-record-stock-buybacks-51545361596. This excerpt was particularly exciting for long term oriented investors:

Why? Because in December there was carnage in the market. Everyone was selling everything indiscriminately. The selling offered up some very interesting opportunities in certain companies. That’s when management teams should pounce.

So what did Facebook, Apple, and Google all do with their cash hoards at that time? Nothing. At least nothing meaningful. And that is a disgraceful outcome given the amount of talent that is at these companies. In retrospect, it’s pretty clear that December was not a fundamentally driven sell off. It was fear based (though Apple actually had a meaningful slowdown in China).

Moreover, these companies had internal data that showed they were healthy. The CFOs knew the businesses were not deteriorating like the stock price. That is the exact time a corporate finance department should increase their buying activity. Especially in a cash generative company! Instead, they sat on their hands.

And that lack of action demonstrates why corporations, in aggregate, are not very good at share repurchases. Corporate buybacks decrease share count and shares historically tend to increase in price. So, for the long term investor buybacks at most prices are better than nothing. But, buybacks have immense potential power and even today’s best companies don’t understand how (or are too scared) to use them properly.

In the interest of disclosure, SCG reduced its cash position from 33% in October to just under 20% by the end of December. This isn’t a promotional statement. In fact, it’s way too early to determine whether that was the right long term decision. But, why in the world were the best companies not meaningfully deploying capital when SCG was? The answer lies in the institutional imperative. And that is a sad realization considering who those companies supposedly employ.